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THE ECONOMICS OF 
URBAN STORMWATER MANAGEMENT 
by Richard V. Butler and Michael D. Maher 
INTRODUCTION 
Flooding from stormwater runoff has long been recognized as a hazard 
of living in areas near streams. For the most part, actions to reduce the like- 
lihood and magnitude of flood damage have focused on providing protec- 
tion at the site of damage. Implicit in these flood protection programs is the 
belief that flooding is a natural phenomenon that cannot be dealt with ef- 
fectively by other means, 
Recent research findings have led engineers-and now economists-to 
view urban stormwater management from an entirely different perspective. 
The pollutant loads contributed to urban watercourses by stormwater run- 
off, long thought to be negligible, appear instead t o  be major sources of 
water quality impairment. As a consequence, current federal legidation re- 
quires that nonpoint source pollution be evaluated in areawide water quality 
planning, The flooding problem also has taken on new dimensions in light 
of the discovery that urbanization can significantly increase peak flows and 
thereby exacerbate flood damage downstream. Public policy reaction to 
this finding has been rather slow to materialize. 
The essential economic problem raised by these findings is that changes 
in upland/upstream land use impose external costs in the form of increased 
pollution and flood damage risk upon downstream residents. Upland/ 
upstream residents and developers have no incentive to change the practices 
that cause the problem since the consequences of the increased runoff are 
borne by others-by the downstream residents themselves, and by the gen- 
eral taxpayer if traditional governmental protection programs are used to 
lessen the damage downstream. Thus, barring fundamental change in the 
nature of stormwater management, we should expect flooding and water 
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quality problems to become steadily worse as upstream development pro- 
ceeds. 
The purpose of this paper is to outline the major features of an effec- 
tive stormwater management system that takes explicit account of the 
important externality aspects we now recognize as significant contributors 
to urban runoff problems. Perhaps the most important finding reported 
here is that these problems are in large measure a consequence of individ- 
ually rational actions by well-meaning firms and households. Before turn- 
ing to  specifics, we must first explore the basic economic principles by 
which potential policy actions are judged. 
Since both the damages suffered by victims of flooding and water qual- 
ity impairment and the measures taken to reduce or avoid these damages are 
costly, the most effective policy is the one that minimizes the sum of dam- 
age costs (D) and treatment or mitigation costs (T) to all affected parties. 
Different policy actions will generally imply different trade-offs among T 
and D. Given that these trade-offs exist, it is extremely unlikely that the 
optimal amount of damage is zero; the cost of complete protection will in 
general be greater than its value to those protected. To  minimize total costs, 
mitigation measures shouId be carried out just up to the point at which an 
additional dollar of T returns exactly one additional dollar of benefits in the 
form of reductions in D. It is in society's interest to carry out treatment in 
the most economical place possible, using the most efficient techniques 
available. The question of who pays for mitigation is an entirely separate 
issue. It is important to note that the mitigation costs borne by the govern- 
mental agency in charge of runoff policy are not necessarily the full social 
costs of the programs that the agency undertakes. For example, nonstruc- 
tural controls that have the effect of removing some land from possible 
development have very low governmental costs, but the income lost to the 
developer as a result of the control program is a cost to society, just as it 
would be if the land were purchased directly by the government. 
We shall now consider some aspects of the stormwater management 
problem in greater detail. 
STORMWATER RUNOFF: PHENOMENON OF NATURE OR EXTERNALITY? 
Most pollution is a byproduct of human activity. Firms and households 
dispose of wastes from their production and consumption activities by re- 
leasing these wastes into the environment. If the quantity of wastes dis- 
charged is great relative to the environment's capacity to  assimilate such dis- 
charges, society suffers a decline in environmental quality. The environ- 
mental costs of human activities differ from other costs of production or 
consumption (such as labor, materials, and capital costs), however, in that 
these costs are largely borne not by the producer but by others. In effect, 
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then, polluters can disregard the external costs that their pollution generates 
for other users of the environment. From the viewpoint of society as a 
whole, pollution damages are real costs and they should be considered as 
such by polluters when they make their production or consumption deci- 
sions. For this reason, public policy toward point sources of pollution has 
been focused on forcing those responsible to reduce their discharges. Since 
it is generally cheaper for polluters to  control their emissions than for other 
users of the environment to treat the pollution they experience, this is usual- 
ly a cost-effective pollution-control policy. 
Stormwater pollution from nonpoint sources can also be seen as an ex- 
ternality problem. Human activities are responsible for leaving on the 
ground large amounts of organic matter, fertilizers, pesticides, ice control 
salts, etc., to  be picked up by stormwater runoff. In addition, construction 
activities (particularly land clearance) lead to  soil erosion, which greatly in- 
creases the volume of suspended solids picked up by runoff and deposited 
into receiving watercourses. Stormwater pollution control, like point source 
control policy, should focus on altering the behavior of those whose activ- 
ities cause the problem as long as it is cost effective to do so. The most effi- 
cient policy instruments for accomplishing this will depend on the nature of 
the pollution-generating activities. The components of effective nonpoint 
source control policy are discussed more fully in the next section. 
As was noted in the introduction, the externality component of urban 
flooding has until recently been ignored by policymakers. Since natural 
forces are responsible for rainfall, it has been assumed that the ensuing run- 
off and flooding are also natural phenomena. Protection from damage has 
thus been the major goal of flood control policy, with firms and households 
in flood-prone areas (and the general public through federal and local flood 
control agencies) having the responsibility for solving the problem. We now 
know that development in a watershed may cause significant changes in the 
runoff pattern produced by any given storm. Urbanization leads to in- 
creases in the natural gradient of the land so that individual parcels will 
drain quickly, to the removal of natural vegetative cover, and to the replace- 
ment of permeable soils by impervious streets, parking lots, and buildings. 
Such changes increase both the volume and speed of runoff, causing much 
higher peak flows in receiving watercourses. The capacity of these streams is 
taxed to a greater extent, and the likelihood of flood damage downstream is 
increased. In short, urban development generates external costs in the form 
of increased runoff and flood damage risk to downstream communities. 
Flooding is thus the result of both human activity and natural forces. 
The externality aspect of stormwater runoff is the fundamental eco- 
nomic problem that must be addressed in a comprehensive management 
program. The key to understanding the resulting policy complexities is that 
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upstream residents and developers have no economic incentives to alter 
their runoff-increasing and quality-degrading behavior, since the adverse 
consequences of these activities are faced by others. A profit-seeking devel- 
oper is concerned only with the costs and benefits that he personally incurs; 
he disregards any other costs that his actions may impose on downstream 
residents. Developers will not voluntarily reduce or clean up their runoff 
because it is not in their interest t o  do  so. Runoff controls are personally 
costly for them, and the benefits of these controls will accrue to the protect- 
ed downstream residents. 
Since market prices reflect only private costs and exclude external 
costs, developments will be less expensive if runoff controls are not under- 
taken. As a consequence, more upstream development will take place than 
if upstream communities were forced to take into account the external costs 
they impose on others. From the viewpoint of society as a whole, too much 
(and the wrong kind of) upstream development will occur, and too much 
flooding and pollution will be experienced downstream (i.e., for some up- 
stream development the costs to all affectedparties will exceed the benefits 
they receive even though development is privately profitable for the firm 
which undertakes it). 
The most important policy implication of viewing flooding as an exter- 
nality problem is that the focus of control must be shifted from controlling 
flooding downstream to reducing runoff upstream. The present emphasis 
on downstream controls is misplaced because it focuses concern away from 
the changes in upstream Iand uses that are the major source of increases in 
peak flows. Downstream flood controls based on the erroneous belief that 
rainfall-runoff patterns are fixed by nature (and are thus unchanging over 
time) will in fact provide less and less protection as upstream urbanization 
takes place and modifies the runoff pattern in a watershed. For example, in 
the 1950s the lower portion of White Oak Bayou in Houston was chan- 
nelized and lined with concrete to  protect nearby residents from the Stand- 
ard Project Flood of approximately 18 inches of rain. Because of unregulat- 
ed upstream urbanization since the completion of this structural control 
project, however, the concrete channel now provides protection against 
only the 30-year storm of about 11 !h inches. Continued unregulated up- 
stream development in the watershed is expected to lower the level of pro- 
tection still further. 
A stormwater management program that is to  be effective not only in 
the present, but also in the future as upstream development occurs, must 
incorporate the most cost-effective mix of upstream runoff reduction and 
downstream flood control. This will almost certainly require that upstream 
residents and deveIopers bear some of the costs by changing the runoff- 
increasing potential of their activities. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLOODING AND WATER QUALITY 
Point source pollution emanates from stationary, easily identified dis- 
charges. Nonpoint source pollution and flooding, on the other hand, arise 
from a near infinitude of sites. Monitoring of individual sources is impossi- 
ble in the latter case, implying that the contribution to external costs of each 
source cannot be measured or identified with much accuracy. In addition, 
nonpoint pollution has highly variable flows because it is solely a wet- 
weather problem. During dry weather, runoff into a stream is negligible. 
But in wet weather nonpoint sources may contribute very high pollution 
loads. These "shock" loads may be extremely damaging to fish and vegeta- 
tion. Mitigation measures will be much more complicated for nonpoint 
sources than for point sources because the runoff pollution problem is relat- 
ed to land use and because monitoring problems make direct regulation of 
the individual source impossible. 
Over 80% of the organic wastes discharged into the nation's water- 
courses in 1974 was generated by nonpoint sources (Council on Environ- 
mental Quality, 1976). Yet, as was noted earlier, virtually all analytic and 
policy attention has until quite recently been focused on point sources of 
pollution. This impressive disparity has arisen in part because point sources 
were easiest to  identify and deal with, and in part because conclusive scien- 
tific evidence of the importance of nonpoint sources has only recently be- 
come available. The relative importance of nonpoint sources has doubtless 
been enhanced, too, by the rigorous federal controls on point sources. A 
change in emphasis is now appropriate. Since the marginal costs of point 
source treatment appear to be steeply increasing (e.g., tertiary treatment of 
sewage is much more expensive than the presently mandated level of sec- 
ondary treatment, yet the resulting improvement in water quality is small), 
further reductions in point source emissions will become increasingly expen- 
sive, Since such a high proportion of the remaining water pollution is from 
nonpoint sources, a sensible pollution control policy must consider the 
trade-offs between the costs of nonpoint source control and the costs of 
achieving still more stringent limitations on point source emissions. 
How can nonpoint source pollution be controlled most efficiently? 
Note first that most runoff pollution is, for all practical purposes, an exter- 
nality problem closely related to  the extent of urbanization in a watershed 
(pollutant loads from undeveloped areas are typically much smaller than 
those from developed reaches). It is important to separate two kinds of 
processes by which urbanization affects water quality. First, development 
increases the speed of runoff as described in the previous section. The faster 
flow increases the tendency of runoff to pick up pollutants from the ground 
and reduces the proportion of pollutants picked up that can settle out of the 
runoff before reaching the receiving watercourse. These effects can be miti- 
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gated by changes in land use (retention ponds, green belts, etc.) that slow 
down the rate of runoff. Controls of this type also provide flood control 
benefits, a fact crucial to policy formulation as discussed below. Note, 
though, that it is possible to affect the levels of some pollutants in runoff 
without changing the pattern of runoff flows produced by a given develop- 
ment. For example, nitrogen concentrations are directly related to the use of 
fertilizers in the watershed. Accordingly, the amount of nitrogen in runoff 
could be affected by measures (such as a purchase tax) that reduce the 
amount of fertilizer used. Under such a program, nitrogen pollution could 
be reduced without producing any flood control benefits, since runoff 
patterns would be unaffected. 
As we noted above, urbanization generally changes the hydrologic 
parameters of a watershed so as to produce-jointly and simul- 
taneously-water quality impairment and an increased risk of flooding. An 
immediate (and until now largely unrecognized) consequence of this joint 
production is that control measures will also be interdependent. Actions 
taken to re.duce the risk of flood damage will often affect water quality; 
similarly, programs to control nonpoint source pollution may change the 
volume and time pattern of runoff, thus affecting the potential for flood 
damage downstream. More formally, the total benefits to society from a 
flood control project (BF) consist of direct flood damage reductions (B,) 
plus the benefits (or minus the costs) of any induced change in water quality 
(BpF). Similarly, the total benefits o f  a nonpoint source control program 
(Bp) consist of direct water quality benefits (Bpp) and related changes in 
flood damage due to  the program's effects on runoff (BFp). In practice, 
though, the agency responsible for flood control chooses its policies by 
comparing BFF and CF (the cost of flood control), while the agency in charge 
of water quality evaluates nonpoint source controls by comparing their cost 
(C,) with Bpp. 
Two types of error arise from this simple comparison of the direct 
benefits and direct costs of each program in isolation. First, the partial equi- 
librium policy choice will be incorrect; that is, for any given initial level of 
flood contiol, the wrong amount of pollution control will be chosen, since 
the further flood control benefits of pollution control programs are ignored 
(symmetrically, the wrong amount of flood control will be chosen given any 
existing level of pollution control). If the policy evaluation were broadened 
to take into account the indirect benefits of each possible control program, 
a second error would still remain, since even the correct partial equilibrium 
analysis does not capture the full extent of interdependence between the 
flooding and water quality problems. Since, for example, flood control 
decisions affect pollution levels, they also affect the decision as to how 
much further withholding of pollution is desirable. The optimal levels of 
flooding and nonpoint source poIlution must therefore be determined 
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simultaneously. Because this is quite difficult to do, the interdependence of 
the two effects greatly complicates the search for an efficient stormwater 
management policy. 
In sum, an efficient flood control policy cannot be found without con- 
sidering water quality policies, and vice versa. What we seek is a strategy 
that maximizes overall net benefits ( B ,  + BF - Cp - Cf). Optimal levels of 
flood control and water pollution control cannot be determined separately, 
especially in a new subdivision where no controls have yet been undertaken. 
The interdependence between pollution control and flood control, in costs 
as well as benefits, or in other words, the joint production problem, re- 
quires a general equilibrium framework that will determine the optimal 
amounts of both externalities simultaneously. This rather complicated 
problem still awaits a formal solution, though we shall be seeking one in the 
course of our research. For the present, though, a significant improvement 
in the effectiveness and efficiency of stormwater management policy would 
result if each proposed poIicy action were evaluated taking into account its 
consequences for both flood damages and water quality. 
THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF EFFECTIVE STORMWATER MANAGEMENT 
As we have seen, urban storrnwater problems arise in part from the 
location of human activity in areas subject to  flooding from natural causes 
and in part from the effects of upstream and upland development, It would 
thus stand to reason that an efficient plan for dealing with these problems 
would involve attention to both aspects-to the reduction of runoff up- 
stream as well as the prevention of damage downstream. A major reason 
for the absence of effective stormwater management in American cities is 
the piecemeal approach t o  control that has generally prevailed. In this 
section we will show that effective management requires unified control 
over an  area at least as large as the watershed. We will aIso discuss some of 
the policy instruments that might be used by the managing authority. 
We have already shown that upstream developers and residents will not 
find it in their interest to alter their externality-causing behavior voluntarily. 
How, then, can they be compelled to reduce the impact of their runoff? In 
most cases, the watershed cuts across several local jurisdictions. The resi- 
dents of upstream communities have nothing t o  gain from imposing storm- 
water controls upon themselves, and the downstream communities lack the 
legal authority to  force them to do  so. Acting in their own economic inter- 
est, communities have frequently encouraged or required stormwater drain- 
age methods that increase flood hazards to other areas. Conventional curb 
and gutter street drainage systems and stream channelization are attractive 
to  developers (and to their communities) because, by removing large quanti- 
ties of runoff from the area quickly, these structural controls decrease flood 
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hazards in their immediate vicinity and increase the amount of developable 
land there. But fast removal methods significantly increase peak flows, sedi- 
ment loads, and runoff speeds, thus reducing water quality and increasing 
flood risks to  downstream communities. Individual municipalities and 
developers have no reason to consider these external costs of their storm- 
water control methods, but a basin-wide agency concerned with the total 
costs (external as well as private costs) of stormwater management would 
have a broader perspective. Basin-wide management thus is the only effec- 
tive means of insuring that the most cost-effective mix of upstream and 
downstream controls-considering costs to  all occupants of the water- 
shed-will be adopted. 
To this point, we have suggested that upstream runoff controls are a 
necessary component of the most efficient stormwater management plan 
for an urban watershed. The question remains, how are these controls to be 
implemented? The remainder of this section explores the nature of efficient 
runoff control policy. 
As we have shown earlier in this paper, the most efficient policy is the 
one that minimizes the sum of damage and mitigation costs to all affected 
parties. This optimum is achieved when, on the margin, an additional 
dollar's worth of mitigation produces just a one dollar reduction in damage 
costs. In practice, it is difficult to  know when the optimum has been 
reached, since some of the mitigation costs and many of the damage costs 
are difficult to measure. For this reason, pollution control programs have 
typicalIy avoided explicit efforts to determine the optimal levels of damage 
and treatment; instead, a maximum tolerable level of damage (in the form 
of ambient air or water quality standards) is established, and polluters must 
reduce their emissions to  a degree consistent with achieving the mandated 
ambient quality standard. Many different techniques can be used to effect 
the desired reduction in emissions. Given any particular ambient standard, 
the task of finding the most efficient control policy is relatively straight- 
forward: the policy should result in the standard being met at the lowest 
total mitigation cost. 
Most control measures that have been implemented by governments or 
suggested in the economic literature on externalities can be classified as pre- 
scriptive standards, performance standards, or economic incentives. A pre- 
scriptive standard is perhaps the most straightforward in principle: each 
polluter is told that he must adopt certain specific control techniques (for 
example, a developer might be required to include a 5-acre retention pond 
for each 100 acres in his development). Compliance is simple: the required 
controls must be installed. The government assumes the responsibility for 
determining which controls will enable the desired ambient standard to be 
met, and emitters need have no  direct concern about the volume of their 
ECONOMICS O F  STORMWATER MANAGEMENT 63 
emissions or the impact of these emissions on the environment so long as the 
required controls are in place. 
In contrast, a performance standard is a requirement that emissions 
not exceed a specified level (for example, a developer might be required to  
limit runoff from his land to the amount that occurred before develop- 
ment), with the choice of control techniques left to  the regulated firm or 
individual. In this case, the emitter is concerned with his emission levels 
since he must find a design that achieves the specified reduction in those 
levels. Once the performance standard has been met, his interest in emission 
levels ceases. 
Economic incentives offer yet another means for control. Here, the 
government sets no explicit emission standard, but levies a tax on each unit 
discharged or pays a subsidy for each unit withheId (for example, devel- 
opers might be told that they would be taxed a dollar for each thousand 
cubic feet of runoff expected to  flow from their land in an average year). 
The government would then adjust the tax or subsidy level until the desired 
ambient standard was met. As with a performance standard, the choice of 
control technique is up t o  the developer, but here the developer has a con- 
tinuing incentive to reduce runoff so long as control measures are cheaper 
than paying the tax. Companies also have a continuing incentive to find new 
approaches that lower the cost of control so that they can reduce emissions 
(and hence their tax bill) as long as they are emitting anything at all. 
Economists generally favor the taxation approach on the ground that it 
is much more likely than either of the standards techniques t o  meet a given 
ambient standard at the lowest total social cost (for a survey of the relevant 
literature see Fischer and Peterson, 1976). The problem with prescriptive 
standards is that less costly control techniques than those prescribed, no 
matter how effective, cannot be used. TJnder such a program, there is little 
incentive t o  search for more efficient controls and significant difficulty in 
introducing them (since the standard would have t o  be changed). Perfor- 
mance standards are more attractive, since the developer is free to choose 
the most cost-effective technique he can find, but here too there is little 
incentive to search for means of reducing runoff further once the standard 
has been met. Emission taxes provide the greatest incentives for efficiency, 
in both the present and the future (subsidies create a number of incentives to  
inefficiency and are thus inferior to  taxes as a control measure [Baumol, 
19721). In the case of flooding and pollution problems related to the quan- 
tity of runoff from an urbanized area, though, the advantage of taxation 
over performance standards is less clear-cut. The runoff-generating charac- 
teristics of a development (the proportion of impervious surfaces, the drain- 
age system, etc.) are essentially fixed once development is complete, so the 
tax is quite unlikely to produce further runoff reductions in the future. 
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A final determinant of the efficient runoff control policy for each com- 
munity is its location within the watershed, since the magnitude of the exter- 
nal costs to downstream residents from that community's runoff is 
location-dependent. As it happens, a given amount of runoff from an adja- 
cent development will affect flood risk and water quality much more than 
will the same amount of runoff from another development further up- 
stream. The longer travel time from the more distant community allows dis- 
tribution and settling of pollution loads and stretches out the impact on 
peak flow over a greater time interval. The policy implication of this finding 
is that runoff controls should be location-specific and should vary in strin- 
gency among the communities in a watershed. Watersheds could be divided 
into zones according to the magnitude of external costs resulting from 
development at each location. The severity of control (e.g., the rate of a 
runoff tax) would be greatest in those zones posing high external costs to  
others, and least in those zones for which development has little potential 
for inflicting harm elsewhere, (A similar proposal for air pollution control 
is presented in Tietenberg, 1974.) 
We have so far focused on finding the most efficient combination of 
mitigation actions for the stormwater problems of urban watersheds. 
Before we conclude this section, a few remarks about who pays for storm- 
water damage and control are in order. 
Consider first a situation in which damages arise only from natural 
flooding. In this case, treatment consists entirely of protection measures; 
present victims of flooding receive all the benefits from the protective activi- 
ties, and no other companies or individuals contribute to the flooding prob- 
lems of the victims. Accordingly, flood protection should be paid for by the 
beneficiaries in amounts equal to the benefits they receive. Any other ar- 
rangement creates incentives for inefficient development, Suppose, for 
example, that all residents of the community pay equal shares of the cost. 
Then those who live in areas subject to little or no damage from flooding 
are subsidizing their fellow citizens who receive most of the benefits from 
protection. This subsidy will attract residents to low-lying areas who would 
not have moved there if taxes were apportioned according to the flood con- 
trol benefits received. 
A similar distortion is introduced if higher levels of government pay 
some of the costs of flood protection. Here, too, excessive development will 
take place in flood-prone areas because the residents of these areas will not 
have to bear the full costs of their location decisions. This effect explains 
why the drafters of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 found it ne- 
cessary to require regulation of floodplain development as a condition for 
receipt of federal flood disaster relief and federally subsidized flood insur- 
ance. Assuming that building in the floodplain does nor impose external 
costs elsewhere, the efficient amount of floodplain development would 
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take place with actuarially fair (unsubsidized) insurance rates and full infor- 
mation about flood hazards even in the absence of direct land use regula- 
tion. 
If stormwater problems are due in part to the external effects of up- 
stream development, it is appropriate on grounds of both equity and effi- 
ciency for upstream residents and developers to bear the costs of control. As 
we noted earlier, the externality problem arises because those upstream do  
not face the full costs of their activities. Placing the burden of control upon 
them eliminates the source of this distortion. But those who generate exter- 
nal costs should not pay for damages due to natural flooding. The latter 
occur only because downstream residents chose to locate in flood-prone 
areas. 
In summary, a basin-wide management agency is needed if urban 
stormwater problems are to  be dealt with fully and effectively. In general, 
mitigation of natural flooding should be paid for by those who benefit from 
the protection program, while the control of externality flooding and water 
quality problems is properly the responsibility of those generating the exter- 
nalities. Typically, an efficient management strategy will require both up- 
stream and downstream controls. For the control of runoff upstream, per- 
formance standards and runoff taxes appear most likely to encourage the 
use of cost-effective management practices. In addition, the severity of con- 
trols should vary among locations within the watershed. 
As a postscript, it is instructive to examine the recent experience of one 
Texas city to see how difficult it can be to achieve efficient stormwater man- 
agement. The city's regulations effectively require developers to withhold 
lOOYo of the additional runoff generated by development. This policy, by 
recognizing and dealing directly with the externality component of damages 
from stormwater runoff, is certainly more enlightened than most. However, 
two problems appear t o  have arisen in practice. First, the cost of 100% 
retention appears to be so high that developers have actively sought alterna- 
tives to development in areas subject to  this regulation. Second, the city is 
not able to exercise control over the entire metropolitan area. As a conse- 
quence, development has leapfrogged the outer portions of its jurisdiction 
and continues, essentially unregulated, a t  more distant sites. What lessons 
can be learned from this experience? For one thing, it may be that 100% re- 
tention is too stringent and costly a control standard given the benefits it 
provides. Further evidence is needed before a definitive determination can 
be made in this case, but (as was noted in the introduction) zero discharge is 
seIdom the optimal solution t o  an externality problem. In addition, the 
movement of development to unregulated areas (doubtless worsening the 
stormwater problems in those watersheds) and the resulting urban sprawl 
demonstrate that stormwater management policy, like many other govern- 
ment actions, can produce unanticipated (and unwanted) byproducts. The 
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experience of this one city suggests that even basin-wide control may be too 
limited in its geographic scope. Given that development locations can move 
in response to  runoff control policy, region-wide management may be 
necessary if that policy is to be effective. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our economic analysis of urban stormwater problems has a number of 
important implications for public policy. The following are especially im- 
portant: 
1) Urban flooding and water pollution are in part the direct result of 
human activity. Accordingly, treatment and mitigation efforts should focus 
on the source of the problem as well as the site of damage. 
2) Control actions should be carried out wherever in the watershed it is 
most efficient to do so. In no case should treatment be extended beyond the 
point at which an additional dollar's expenditure on treatment returns just 
one dollar in benefits from damage reduction. 
3) Implementation of an efficient control strategy will in general re- 
quire basin-wide management, since the extent of the problem is basin- 
wide. 
4) Full social costs, not the apparent costs to particular individuals, 
firms, or government agencies, should be used as the basis for evaluation of 
alternative control programs. 
5) The pollution and flooding problems are produced jointly, so it will 
make sense to plan for joint treatment. Water quality improvements arising 
as byproducts of certain flood control methods should be counted as bene- 
fits of these programs (and vice versa). 
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